Why did Saddam Hussein reject UN inspections

Why did Saddam Hussein reject UN inspections

[To Read] (backed up in case it gets removed)

From: https://old.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/1ffje3i/why_did_saddam_hussein_resist_un_weapons/

There are multiple theories that scholars have debated over, and I'll give you the one I find most plausible given the evidence. However, I should first clarify that the entire span of the 90s had different phases of disclosure.

For example, right at the cease-fire (April 1991) the Iraqi did work to try to conceal their WMD capabilities, and they destroyed caches rather than confess about the cover-up. Later in 1991 they started to admit to more (as the UN started to make discoveries) but still didn't fully reveal everything; it was only until the defection of Hussein Kamil (Saddam Hussein's son in law, 1995) did the final disclosures happen.

Part of the issue is that the staggered revelations made it hard to trust the Iraqis that there were not further shoes to drop. This is combined with the fact that Hussein actually used chemical warfare (mustard gas and nerve agents in the late 80s) and the fact the US knew was Hussein set to use chemical weapons on the joint coalition in 1991; they got it on tape:

I want to make sure that the germ and chemical warheads are available to the concerned people, so that in case we order an attack, they can do it without missing any targets.

But on to the theories. Note that these are still open to debate and there may be some combination of factors.

Bluffing: they didn't want their enemies to know they were disarmed, so they intentionally created uncertainty.

Self-uncertainty: the Iraqi leaders themselves may have been unaware, as some advisors may have made misleading statements (due to confusion, not wanting to displease a dictator, etc.)

Security concerns: some locations were "sensitive" for reasons other than WMD, and the obstructions tended to be on locations like presidential facilities where they may have had concern about leaking intelligence

Actual WMDs: there were in fact caches of chemical weapons found, although only only a small portion were viable and they appeared to be old misplaced stock (only ~6% working in one cache, for instance), but this still led to theorizing at the time of shipments to Syria (no proof has been found)

However, the strongest argument I've heard is from Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, who in a 2020 article for the journal International Security called it a "principal agent problem". Essentially, the orders given were reliant on "agents" who did inconsistent implementation. For example, some senior officials "punished some behavior that was consistent with regime policy" -- that is, some agents tried to follow the directions but were punished for doing so! Some agents did not want to follow orders for their own reasons. Some simply failed or cheated and failed to report what happened.

This structural issue was not new for the regime; there was staff in the 70s chemical program found to have committed fraud, and Kamil in the 1980s (the one who later defected) violated an explicit order in the late 80s about importing nuclear equipment. Information was not shared freely; as Braut-Hegghammer notes:

Authoritarian systems erode information processing, sometimes to the point of absurdity.

For example, going back to April 1991: the head of weapons (Jafar D. Jafar) endorsed a plan to declare all WMDs up front, while Kamil thought Iraq should only declare things the coalition knew about. A later directive from Kamil led to documents and weapons being destroyed; for example, test munitions were thrown into the Tigris River. In the midst of all these sensitive information was straight out lost with no inventory or explanation.

Some of the officials (given the fact Jafar wanted to be up-front) didn't know about the destruction which led to confusion and contradictory statements. Simultaneous to this, inspectors on the ground saw the scramble themselves, with "hectic activity involving trucks, forklifts, and heavy equipment" observed on June 23rd and a convoy of 60-90 trucks on Jun 28 (which the inspectors could tell contained elements from a nuclear program).

From July of that year up until 1995 they took on a "mixed strategy" which included concealment; again there were differences of opinions as to how this would be implemented. Tariq Aziz (Deputy Prime Minister) had the goal of limiting disclosures to things the inspectors found -- but for those things that the UN know about, divest themselves completely. Kamil tried for a more "dual-use" approach which would allow quick re-instatement of capabilities. Kamil would actually tell people to ignore things that Saddam Hussein had said.

Hussein created a committee led by Aziz to help with cooperation where they determined they would

minimize disclosure of prior WMDs

protect anything that could be used for civilians later

avoid identifying international partners

not reveal the concealment efforts of the Special Republican Guard

There was a simultaneous secret committee (including Kamil) intended to continue with concealment and this was separate from Aziz and the programs did not understand what each other were doing.

Part of the issue was a lack of understanding of technical matters from the leaders. For instance, Kamil had the goal of making it so nuclear programs could easily be reconstituted; according to Mahdi Obeidi (Saddam's "nuclear mastermind") in a later book, this was perhaps too optimistic. Items that could theoretically be "dual use" were not dual use in reality. For example, some inspectors asked Obeidi about aluminum tubes that had been ordered that could theoretically be used in a centrifuge:

The diameter of the tubes Iraq had ordered was eighty-one millimeters to meet the specifications of our artillery rockets. The centrifuge rotors we had worked with during the late 1980s were nearly twice this diameter. This major discrepancy alone would have rendered all of our designs and blueprints useless and required a complete redesign of the program.

One of the projects Kamil handed to the UN was Project Babylon, a "super-gun" that could launch weapons into space, making Saddam Hussein furious, who pointed out that this was not covered under the UN resolutions.

When Kamil defected in '95, the Iraqi leadership wasn't even sure just how much he knew. The regime made further disclosures trying to get ahead of the problem; they disclosed far more than Kamil did. However, this change in direction was not easy to filter down the chain; for example, they made new admissions about biological weapons, but the people further down the chain of command remained consistent in recalcitrance and denial.

Even after '95 there was open disagreement as to policy and it meant that any official statement was only potentially followed. Aziz explicitly let the UN know they were having "trouble with their subordinates who had thought of Hussein Kamel as Buddha" -- in other words, those instructed by the secret committee to stay with the concealment policy were not thrilled to suddenly drop it. Scientists were threatened with execution in '96 if they did not hand over all WMD-related documents, but even then, there were things withheld.

In sum: Iraq started with a policy of partial concealment, and even when they went for full disclosure, the paranoia and concealment of the regime ended up being too hard to unwind -- even with the people in charge unleashing whatever threats they could.

...

Braut-Hegghammer, M. (2020). Cheater's dilemma: Iraq, weapons of mass destruction, and the path to war. International Security, 45(1), 51-89.

Malone, D. M. (2006). The International Struggle Over Iraq: Politics in the UN Security Council 1980-2005. Oxford University Press.

Obeidi, M., & Pitzer, K. (2008). The Bomb in My Garden: The Secrets of Saddam’s Nuclear Mastermind. Turner Publishing Company.

Reports of Weapons of Mass Destruction Findings in Iraq: Hearing Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, One Hundred Ninth Congress, Second Session, Hearing Held, June 29, 2006. (2007). U.S. Government Printing Office.

Woods, K. M., Palkki, D. D., & Stout, M. E. (Eds.). (2011). The Saddam Tapes: The Inner Workings of a Tyrant's Regime, 1978–2001. Cambridge University Press.